In this paper we propose a model in which there are ideological and strategic voters who vote under poportional rule. We prove that the behavior of ideological voters matters for the determination of the outcome. We show that a subset of strategic voters partially counteracts the votes of the ideological voters.
Introduction
Electorates are typically constituted by two types of voters, those who are committed to vote for a speci…c party -its hard-core supporters, and those who vote in a more strategic fashion to get their way as regards the policies that are going to be implemented. The result of a general election can be expected to be in ‡uenced by the interplay of the behavior of these two types of voters. The present paper addresses such an interplay in the context of an election held with a proportional system. Speci…cally, we study a society composed of policy motivated strategic citizens and ideological citizens, who vote for one of a …nite number of parties by proportional rule.
Given the electoral result, the policy outcome is a linear combination of the position of each party, weighed by the share of votes a party gets in the election. We ask, …rst, if the ideological voters'behavior a¤ects the …nal outcome; second, how strategic voters respond to that.
We prove that the behavior of ideological voters matters for the outcome. In particular, we show that the policy will, in general, be di¤erent with respect to the case where all voters act strategically, even with an arbitrarily small number of ideological voters. Concerning the second question, we show how some strategic voters change their voting behavior to, at least partially, counteract the ideological citizens' vote. Strategic voters will vote in accord with a cutpoint outcome: in equilibrium, any strategic voter on the right of the cutpoint votes for the rightmost party and any strategic voter on its left votes for the leftmost party. The intuition is the following.
Given the ideological voting behavior, strategic voters misrepresent their preferences by voting for the extremist parties in order to drag the policy outcome toward their preferred policy.
The model extends to an environment with ideological voters, the analysis of De Sinopoli and Iannantuoni (2007) , who study strategic voting under proportional rule and …nd that essentially only a two-party equilibrium exists, in which voters vote only for the two extremist parties. The voting literature (Shepsle (1991) , Cox (1997) , Persson and Tabellini (2000) ) has dealt with models in which either all voters are strategic or all are ideological. An analysis of the more realistic case in which both types coexist is missing. This paper also reconciles the two-party equilibrium result in De Sinopoli and Iannantuoni (2007) , with the view that proportional systems should lead to multipartyism (see Cox 1997 ).
The rest of the paper is organized as follow. In section 2 we describe the model;
we present an example in section 3; we analyze the pure strategy equilibria, and, then, the mixed strategy ones in section 4; we go back to the example in section 5; section 6 concludes.
The Model
Policy space. The policy space X is a closed interval of the real line. Without loss of generality, we assume X = [0; 1].
Parties. There is an exogenously given set of parties M = f1; :::; k; :::mg, with m 2, indexed by k. Each party k is characterized by a policy k 2 [0; 1]. In order to simplify the notation, in the following we will denote L the leftmost party and R the rightmost (i.e., L = arg min k2M k ; R = arg max k2M k ).
Voters. There is a …nite set of voters N = f1; :::; i; :::ng. Each voter i, characterized by a bliss point i 2 [0; 1], has single peaked preferences. The set of voters N is partitioned in two subsets N and N , denoting respectively the set of strategic and ideological voters. We indicate the cardinality of N by n , and the cardinality of N by n . Hence, n = n + n . We denote with H ( ) the distribution of the strategic voters'bliss points. Ideological voters. A natural way to model ideological voters is to assume that their strategy space is degenerate, coinciding with the vote in favor of their preferred party, i.e. the party whose policy is closer to the voter bliss point. We denote by N k the set of ideological voters who vote for party k and with n k its cardinality. Hence,
Proportional rule and the policy outcome. Given a pure strategy combination s = (s 1 ; s 2 ; :::; s n ), we de…ne v(s) = P policies with coe¢ cients equal to the share of votes corresponding to each party:
The game. Given the set of parties and the utility function u, a …nite game is given by the set of voters N , the subset of strategic voters with their bliss points, and the subsets of ideological voters: 
Example 1
Before moving on to the solution, an illustrative example is in order. There is a leftist party (L) with policy in 0, a moderate party (M) with policy in 0.5, a rightist party (R) with policy in 1. Figure 1 depicts the situation.
The policy outcome is determined, given a pure strategy combination, according to (1) . The objective of the strategic voters is to obtain a policy which is as close as possible to their bliss point. Consider the following pure strategy combination. (1) = 0:41. This pure strategy combination is a Nash Equilibrium, since if any voter changes his vote to a di¤erent party, the policy outcome moves farther away from his bliss point. The Moderate party gets no votes, the Left 118, the Right 82. This is the only pure strategy Nash Equilibrium in this case.
Hence, relative to a situation without ideologically committed voters, some moderate voters change their behavior voting for a party at the opposite end of the political spectrum to o¤set the behavior of the ideological voters. Also, all three parties get some votes here, unlike in the case without ideological voters where only the extreme left and right parties obtain votes in the election.
In the following sections, we provide the complete analysis for both pure and mixed strategies and show that the intuition gained through this simple example carries over to the general setting.
6
We start the analysis of strategic voters'behavior by …rst focusing on the case when players only play pure strategies. We start with an intuitive but key result for rational voters' behavior: in every pure strategy equilibrium strategic voters vote for one of the two extremist parties, except for a neighborhood whose length is inversely proportional to the total number of players.
Proposition 1 Let s be a pure strategy equilibrium of a game with n voters:
, implies that L is the unique best reply, for player i, to s i . ( ) A symmetric argument holds.
The intuition is that strategic voters have an incentive to vote for the extremist parties in order to drag the policy outcome toward their favored policy. Notice that the result only depends on the total number of voters, n, not on the particular composition of the electorate, i.e. not on n and n .
In the light of this result, it seems natural to focus on a strategy combination such that any strategic voter strictly on the left of the policy outcome votes for L, and any strategic voter strictly on the right of the policy outcome votes for R. We provide the following de…nition: De…nition 1 Cutpoint policy outcome. Given a game and the distribution of strategic voters'bliss points H ( ), let~ , de…ned as cutpoint policy, be the unique policy outcome obtained with strategic voters strictly on its left voting for L and strategic voters strictly on its right voting for R, i.e. let~ be implicitly de…ned by:
where H is the correspondence de…ned by H ( ) = lim y! H (y); H ( ) .
In the expression de…ning the cutpoint policy outcome, the e¤ect of the ideological and rational voters on the policy outcome can be seen most clearly. The …rst term of the right-hand side of (2) represents the e¤ect of the strategic voters' behavior, weighted by the share of the strategic voters on the cutpoint, while the second term is the "…xed" e¤ect of the ideological voters' behavior, weighted by the share of ideological voters on the total number of voters.
Let us assume that no strategic voter's preferred policy coincides with the cutpoint outcome. If all strategic players vote according to the cutpoint, no strategic player on its left/right has an incentive to vote for any party di¤erent from L=R, because doing so would push the policy outcome farther away from his preferred policy. We can, then, state the following proposition:
Proposition 2 If i 6 =~ 8i 2 N , then the strategy combination given by
is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the game .
In general, we cannot be sure that pure strategy equilibria exist; moreover, we have to investigate whether mixed strategy equilibria would prescribe a di¤erent behavior for strategic voters. For these reasons we extend the analysis to the case where voters are allowed to play mixed strategies.
The following result proves that basically a unique Nash equilibrium exists. The equilibrium is such that any strategic player on the right of the cutpoint outcome votes for the rightmost party, and any strategic player on the left of the cutpoint outcome votes for the leftmost party, except for a neighborhood inversely related to the total number of voters.
Proposition 3 8 > 0, 9n 1 such that 8n n 1 if is a Nash equilibrium of a game with n voters then:
Proof. See the Appendix.
Every equilibrium conforms to the cutpoint, and hence, for n large enough, strategic voters essentially vote only for the two extremists parties.
Comparisons

Example 1 (continued)
We compute the cutpoint for the example provided above. The e¤ect pertaining to strategic voters is
while the "…xed e¤ect" of ideological voters is 
Since there is the same number of strategic and ideological voters, the weights for the two e¤ects are equal and the cutpoint is The example can be used to perform some comparative static exercises to better grasp the e¤ect of ideological voters. We can see, for instance, that the presence of twice as many ideological voters -keeping their position …xed-would not change (3) and (4), but would modify the population weights and the new cutpoint would be closer to the midpoint. Hence, a higher number of ideological voters would lead to a more moderate scenario.
Alternatively, one could think of keeping the number of ideological voters …xed but tilt their distribution. In this case, pretty much anything can happen. The cutpoint can even move away from the midpoint, if there are enough extremist ideological voters.
General comparisons
More generally, we can use the formula for the cutpoint (2) to understand the e¤ect of ideological voters. First, let us consider the case where everybody is strategic. The cutpoint policy outcome in this case is
When some of the voters are ideological, the cutpoint outcome is:
The …rst term of the right-hand side of the above expression represents the e¤ect on the policy outcome of the strategic voters'behavior. Clearly, this e¤ect is analogous to the cutpoint when everybody is strategic, but now weighted by the share of strategic 
Conclusion
We have provided a model in which there are policy motivated strategic voters who take their voting decision maximizing their utilities, and ideological voters, who simply cast their ballot in favor of the party whose policy is closest to their preferred one.
The main question has been whether ideological voting behavior really matters. The answer has been a¢ rmative. We have proved that there is basically a unique Nash equilibrium characterized by a cutpoint outcome such that any strategic voter on its left votes for the leftmost party and any strategic voter on its right votes for the rightmost party. Moreover, there is a "…xed e¤ect" of the ideological voters'behavior on the equilibrium outcome to which strategic voters react voting for an extremist party to drag the policy outcome closer to their preferred one, even though they can only partially adjust.
7 Appendix (not meant for publication)
Mixed Strategy Analysis
We prove here that in any mixed strategy equilibrium, except for a neighborhood inversely related to the total number of players, strategic voters vote for the extremist parties. This result is needed to prove Proposition 3.
Given the set of candidates M and the utility function u, a game is characterized by the set of players, the set of strategic voters and their bliss points, as well as the set of ideological voters. Let = ( 1 ; :::; n ) and = P Claim 1 8" > 0, 9n 0 such that 8n n 0 if is a Nash equilibrium of a game with n voters then:
The following pieces of notation are needed. Given a mixed strategy j ; the player j's vote is a random vector 
By Chebychev's inequality we know that 8k; 8 :
Hence Pr s
which is strictly greater than 1 for n > m 4 2 + 1: Consider case ( ) …rst.
, if the game has n voters and if i < X ( ) ", then L is the only best reply for player i 2 N to i .
Proof. Fix " > 0: De…ne 8 2 0; 1
By single-peakedness we know that M " ( ) < 0: Moreover, given the continuity of @u(X; ) @X we can apply the theorem of the maximum 4 to deduce that the function M " ( ) is continuous, hence it has a maximum on 0; 1
, which is strictly negative. Let
Let cannot be a best reply for player i, which, setting n 0 equal to the smallest integer strictly greater than m 4
2 " + 1, directly implies the claim.
6
Take a party c 6 = L. By de…nition c 2 BR i ( ) =)
which can be written as:
Because the outcome function X (s) depends only upon v(s), denoting with V i n the set of all vectors representing the share of votes obtained by each party with (n 1) voters, (8) can be written as:
where, with abuse of notation, X (v which implies that c is not a best reply for player i 2 N .
Analogously, for case ( ) the following Lemma can be proved. Finally, we prove Proposition 3.
Proof. Fix and in Claim 1, take " = 2 : For the corresponding n 0 it is easy to see that if n n 0 and is a Nash equilibrium of , then~ 
